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Abstract
With ever increasing urgency, the United Nations (UN) has worked to develop 
the budding security relationship between itself and regional economic 
communities (RECs) in Africa, especially the African Union (AU), the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). In conflict resolution efforts in 
Southern Africa, this relationship has sometimes featured competition and 
tension, with more than one organisation vying for the lead, or in other cases, 
trying to pass the blame for failures. Since the UN’s early peace mission in 
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the Congo under Dag Hammarskjöld, achieving peace and stability in Africa 
has been a monumental task. This article explores whether new regional 
partnerships can help facilitate this goal in Southern Africa and whether the 
current principles of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations 
are sufficient for the task at hand. This article takes lessons from the conflict 
resolution efforts in Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC) to illustrate recent examples of cooperation and/
or competition as they are unfolding in the present, with an emphasis on 
analysing the institutional relationship between the UN, AU and SADC in 
Southern Africa. This article concludes that there are still major limitations 
on the successful regionalisation of conflict management efforts in Southern 
Africa and that the UN and its partner organisations need to clarify and 
improve their working relationship to improve their chances of facilitating 
successful peacemaking.
Introduction
Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) are playing an increasingly 
important role in peace and security. The RECs were originally established with 
mainly economic goals in mind, including enhancing economic integration, 
trade, and development; more recently, they have added peace and security 
agendas as such matters have become increasingly pressing and unavoidable. 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) made this clear 
link when it concluded that the community could not pursue its economic 
and social objectives without first consolidating peace, hence requiring the 
Community’s focus on this issue in its first security related protocol in 1978 
(ECOWAS 1978). The process of RECs building security instruments is 
still taking place today. Indeed, these institutions, their governing rules and 
their relationships are still taking shape (Adetula 2008). It has become clear, 
however, that there are tensions and inconsistencies in the strategies and 
working relationships between the UN, the African Union (AU) and regional 
communities, which are, in certain circumstances, undermining the likelihood 
of successfully managing conflict resolution efforts and establishing peace. 
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While security scholars have been more likely to focus on the role of regional 
organisations in military peacekeeping, these organisations can and do play a 
role in non-military peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts, which remains 
the subject of fewer academic inquiries and intergovernmental strategies. This 
article explores the role of regional organisations in the non-military functions 
of peace and security, including preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and 
mediation, considering the role of the UN and AU in cooperating with such 
efforts at the regional level. While all of the sub-regions of Africa face similar 
quandaries, each sub-region also has its own peculiar challenges and differences 
in the level of development and cooperation on peace and security issues. The 
focus here is on Southern Africa with potentially relevant conclusions being 
drawn for other regions.
The tension and resultant competition between the UN, AU and regional 
organisations, and among regional organisations themselves, have limited 
the potential success of conflict resolution efforts and of establishing lasting 
peace. This problem is acute in Southern Africa, where the highly political 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) comes into conflict 
with the UN and/or the AU. In Zimbabwe, Madagascar and the DRC, this 
tension and lack of cooperation have been problematic and visible in conflict 
resolution efforts. Lessons from these cases make this point. In order to 
better manage peacemaking efforts and help facilitate more lasting peace, 
international and regional organisations need to clarify and improve upon 
their working principles and stop disagreements and the lack of coordination 
from hindering peacemaking. 
The regionalisation of peace and security
The UN has promoted the regionalisation of peace and security, heralding it 
as a necessary shift and an effective way to manage certain types of conflict. 
The organisation envisions a two-tiered conflict management system with 
regional organisations playing the on-the-ground role and the UN serving 
a coordinating role from above (Jackson 2000), as outlined in the then UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace. Malan 
(1999) has dubbed this a ‘peace pyramid’ with the sub-regional organisations 
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and the OAU/AU acting as the initial respondents to the armed conflict, while 
the UN contributes more to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction 
at the top of the pyramid. Since the debacle in Somalia in 1994, Western 
countries have become more unwilling to directly intervene to end conflicts 
in Africa; there is therefore, a real and undeniable need for African states to 
find their own solutions to the continent’s conflicts (Adebajo 2008). In 1995 
the UN report Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peace-keeping 
in Africa further argued that ‘sub-regional organizations sometimes have a 
comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement 
of conflicts and to assist the UN in containing them’.
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was the first regional organisation 
in Africa to deal with peace and security issues. However, the OAU shied 
from involvement in disputes within Member States, establishing that the 
organisation’s most fundamental stance was one of non-intervention and 
the prioritisation of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (Van 
Nieuwkerk 2004; Okoth 2008). However, in 1993, at a conference in Cairo, 
the OAU established a Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution which served as a signal of the continent’s renewed interest in 
peacemaking. In regard to the RECs, the declaration tentatively explained 
that the OAU was to ‘coordinate its activities with the African regional and 
sub-regional organizations’ (Organisation of African Unity 1993: Section 24). 
Since the OAU established its sub-regional structures in 1972 (Organisation 
of African Unity 1972), there has been an implied OAU position that the 
organisation may intervene in regional matters under certain conditions: when 
regional efforts were exhausted or the sub-regional organisation’s credibility 
was lacking, or where conflict spilled into other regions (Mwanasali 2003). Yet 
a 1999 study, commissioned by the OAU on the functioning of cooperation 
between the OAU and sub-regional organisations in the realm of conflict 
resolution, found that the unclear division of labour and responsibilities and 
the lack of an institutionalised arrangement for conflict management between 
the organisations was limiting their effectiveness (cited in Mwanasali 2003).
Moreover, responses by sub-regional organisations in Africa have usually 
been ad hoc because there was a lack of institutionalised structures at the 
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sub-regional level to deal with conflict management and resolution activities, 
especially non-military activities (Malan 1999). The OAU took a case-by-
case approach in its early peacemaking efforts which became the norm for 
the continent, relying on political leaders and individual countries to make 
security decisions instead of a collective supranational body (Imobighe 2003). 
Furthermore, when the RECs started to engage more directly with peace and 
security matters in the 1990s, there was no effective continental framework or 
mechanism to harmonise these efforts or coordinate relations with them and 
the OAU and the UN. The OAU’s failure to reach out to the growing group of 
sub-regional actors who were becoming active in peace operations allowed the 
OAU to eventually become irrelevant as an organisation (Abass 2010). 
The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ was supposed to govern this relationship. It 
implies that regional arrangements or regional institutions should make 
‘every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes’ before referring 
them to the Security Council, as originally enshrined in Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter (1945). The norm also preceded the Charter in other emerging 
international organisations (Møller 2005). Laurie Nathan (2010a), however, 
holds that there is no consensus on how subsidiarity is to be applied to the 
task of peacemaking, and no consensus generally on its application within the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Neither the AU nor the RECs 
have specifically defined or clarified how subsidiarity would be implemented 
in non-military peacemaking efforts. This lack of a definition from the 
organisations is a significant omission on their part, illustrating that despite 
support for regionalisation, the governing principles of this relationship 
remain unclear and insufficiently considered. 
Regional organisations can help bring the resources and leverage required 
to sustain a successful peace process, but must also determine a way to 
manage the interests and demands that emerge from local and international 
actors (Khadiagala 2007). Supporters of a regional approach contend that 
regional actors’ familiarity with the region, including the cultural, social and 
historical factors, can make them more effective on the ground. Geographical 
proximity should facilitate quicker and less expensive responses. Additionally, 
sub-regional organisations should also be more committed to seeing out 
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enduring conflict resolution in their region having such a strong stake in 
creating peace in their neighbourhood and avoiding the negative effects of 
conflicts, such as cross-border refugee flows. As Franke (2006) argues, the 
comparative advantages of the international (UN) and regional level can be 
combined for the most efficient response to conflicts. However it must be 
cautioned that peacemaking efforts led by a regional organisation, rather than 
a simple unilateral or bilateral team, require greater levels of coordination and 
cooperation to harness these potential advantages.
The regionalisation of peacemaking in Africa will obviously be closely related 
to the continued evolution and development of the AU, where the RECs 
have been considered ‘building blocks’ of the APSA (African Union 2002). 
Mwanasali (2003:206) contends that the success of the AU will ‘depend, to a 
large extent, on the ways in which [RECs] and regional security arrangements 
will merge into the AU’. It was planned that these necessary relationships 
and cooperative structures would be defined in the protocol relating to the 
establishment of the AU’s peace and security body and later legal frameworks. 
Principles of the regional organisation relationship in 
Africa
While the regional conflict management relationship has been revived and 
revitalised by the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002, its early 
principles were defined in the UN Charter (1945). Chapter VIII of the Charter 
briefly describes the relationship between the UN and regional organisations. 
Article 33(1) calls for Member States to attempt to resolve their members’ 
disputes through diplomatic means and/or through regional arrangements. 
These provisions appear to create a sense of duty on the part of regional 
organisations to intervene first and organise peacemaking operations in 
their own regions whenever possible, even though the UN is still primarily 
responsible for international peace and security.
The establishment of the AU included better defining the relationship with the 
UN and the RECs. At its inaugural summit in 2002, AU members established 
the Peace and Security Council (PSC) that would oversee and arrange possible 
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interventions under ‘grave circumstances’ such as war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity (African Union 2002: Art 4(h)). In the PSC 
Protocol (African Union 2002) the drafters emphasise ‘the need to develop 
formal coordination and cooperation arrangements between these Regional 
Mechanisms and the African Union’. Article 16 also states that peace, security 
and stability activities need to be harmonised, coordinated and developed 
through an effective partnership between the organisations. Further, under 
Article 16(1)(b), it establishes that ‘the modalities of such partnership shall 
be determined by the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing 
circumstances’. The principle of comparative advantage recognises the fact, 
inter alia, that some of the sub-regional organisations were actually more 
advanced or more competent in peace operations than the AU was at the time 
(Abass 2010).
Further details on the framework for the peace and security relationship 
between the organisations were also laid out in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security 
which was signed in June 2008 between the AU and eight of the RECs (African 
Union 2008a). The MoU, a binding legal instrument, obliges the parties to 
‘institutionalize and strengthen their cooperation and closely coordinate their 
activities,’ signalling the strong commitment to moving beyond informal 
collaboration and politicking. Under Article VII – Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution – the MoU calls for the parties to cooperate 
specifically in peacemaking activities to resolve conflicts that have occurred 
and prevent their recurrence through the means of ‘good offices, mediation, 
conciliation, enquiry and deployment of peace support missions’. This signals 
that the agreement does not just cover military operations. 
The MoU explains that the principles of ‘subsidiarity, complementarity and 
comparative advantage’ will guide decisions to optimise peace operations. 
Under Article IV (ii), however, the MOU also recognises and respects ‘the 
primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of 
peace, security and stability in Africa’. The Modalities section (Article XX) of 
the MoU clarifies that: 
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Without prejudice to the primary role of the Union in the 
promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability 
in Africa, the RECs and, where appropriate, the Coordinating 
Mechanisms shall be encouraged to anticipate and prevent conflicts 
within and among their Member States and, where conflicts do 
occur, to undertake peace-making and peace-building efforts to 
resolve them, including the deployment of peace support missions.
It is significant to note that there is no clause that requires a REC to obtain 
explicit approval for a peacemaking or peacebuilding mission before it 
undertakes one, allowing for possible conflicts over which an organisation has 
jurisdiction or the lead role, or allowing organisations to pass blame if they 
choose not to act. 
One problem is that both the UN and the AU claim primacy in the handling of 
peace and security issues. Under the UN, it is the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
which has the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security’. On the other hand, Article 16 of the PSC Protocol 
(African Union 2002) states that the Union has the ‘primary responsibility’ 
for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. It is still unclear how 
this clash of principles is interpreted by the AU and even further, under the 
RECs which are the ‘pillars’ of the continental peace and security architecture. 
While all of these organisations are ostensibly working towards the same goals, 
reconciling their cooperation and working relationship is proving difficult, 
especially over certain conflict resolution and peacemaking methods. 
The language of ‘subsidiarity and complementarity’ is gaining a foothold in 
AU thinking, with the AU Commission, the organisation’s secretariat, also 
stating that it will be guided by the operating principles of ‘subsidiarity and 
complementarity with other Organs, Member States and RECs (African Union 
2010). Yet this simple statement leaves much open to interpretation. Clearly 
there is a desire for enhanced partnership and cooperation between the UN 
and all of the African regional mechanisms, but there is a contradiction, or at 
least tension, between the ‘primary responsibility’ of the UNSC, the ‘primary 
responsibility’ of the Union, as noted in the PSC Protocol, and the principle 
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of subsidiarity, emphasised in the MoU and by the Commission. This tension 
is an obstacle in the establishment of a clear, institutionalised working 
relationship between these organisations when it comes to cooperation on 
peacemaking. Rather than clearly institutionalising a decision-making process 
on who takes the lead in peacemaking and mediation efforts, it is excessively 
flexible, leaving room for high politics and/or personal and national interests 
to become crucial factors in initiating peacemaking efforts. Without specifying 
who has the decision-making power or what the decision-making process will 
be, decisions may be taken in an ad hoc manner, beholden to the power politics 
of the region or of the regional organisations that are potentially involved. 
Challenges in implementing the working relationship 
The UN Report of the high-level panel on threats, challenges and change (United 
Nations 2004) recommended that authorisation from the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) should be sought in all cases for regional peace operations, 
recognising that in some urgent situations, authorisation may be sought after 
such operations have commenced (cited in Zwanenburg 2006). However, no 
such authorisation would be needed for a peacemaking effort that does not 
entail the use of force since this falls squarely under pacific means in the UN 
Charter. Therefore, there is no mandate for the UN to oversee or coordinate 
the response on a typical peacemaking operation. While the AU has sought 
to establish itself as the coordinating and mandating organisation for the 
continent, there is similarly no requirement for peacemaking authorisation 
within its Constitutive Act, and the sub-regional organisations often do act 
independently. 
The UN Secretary-General has noted the cooperation that has taken place 
between the AU, sub-regional organisations and the UN in ‘nearly every 
mediation effort in Africa’ (United Nations 2008). While the Peace and Security 
Department of the AU is charged with elaborating the mechanisms for effective 
cooperation and harmonisation of peace and security policies with the sub-
regional organisations (African Union n.d.), in reality, this cooperation is not 
so obvious. In practice, it is atypical if there is first deference to the relevant 
regional organisation, then to the AU, and then only to the UN, if both of the 
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lower levels have failed to resolve the local dispute. In most cases, a whole 
variety of organisations clamour to get involved. With some AU personnel 
believing that the Union has absolute primacy in all African cases, they show 
no deference to any other body. Yet each regional organisation is composed 
of and led by sovereign states which have their own decision-making forums 
that are not deferential to other bodies and may craft independent policies in 
response to a conflict in their region (Nathan 2010a). Furthermore, regional 
organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS, which established their regional 
security mechanisms before the AU was formed in 2002, feel that they have 
more experience and expertise in their region than the AU. For this reason, 
they will not always follow AU recommendations, despite the fact that it is 
supposed to be the coordinating organisation (Adebajo 2010). This mixed 
collection of beliefs and practices means that subsidiarity is clearly not being 
consistently applied, leading to acute tension and competition between the 
organisations.
The concept of ‘comparative advantage’ has become dominant in the literature 
and in the protocols of the UN and the regional organisations, including 
the Statement by the President of the Security Council on relations between 
the UN and regional organizations, particularly the AU (United Nations 
2007). Yet what has proven elusive is the clear definition of each regional 
organisation’s comparative advantages, and the determination and application 
of these advantages in each unique conflict situation. Possible ‘comparative 
advantages’ for regional organisations may include previous experience 
in peace management in the region, already established mechanisms for 
conflict management, and proximity, which leads to better understanding of 
the conflict and/or more legitimacy in the political realm (Bogland, Egnell 
and Lagerström 2008). Effective third-party mediation is also dependent 
on ‘the mediator’s capabilities and leverage ... the linkage between the third 
party and the conflict and the extent to which the mediators see themselves 
as stakeholders’ (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999:32). On the other hand, 
proximity may also jeopardise the neutrality and acceptability of a regional 
organisation (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008). These factors balance 
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against one another, making a sub-regional organisation more or less well-
suited to take a lead peacemaking role.
Comparative advantage infers that some organisations, and thereby some 
mediators, are better qualified to lead a peacemaking process, depending on 
the given circumstances. Establishing a general rule that stipulates that the 
lead mediator should always be the AU, the UN or the relevant REC, goes 
against this common sense notion. Rather, some criterion for being best 
suited as the lead mediating organisation might include: ‘the organization’s 
unity and cohesion in relation to the conflict; its acceptability to the parties; its 
knowledge of the conflict; the resources at its disposal; and personal relations 
with party leaders that would be helpful to peacemaking’ (Nathan 2009:25). 
Problematically, there are no clear criteria such as these currently approved 
and there is no agreed decision-making process to debate these qualifications 
between the organisations. None of the documents say who will be determining 
which organisation or actor has comparative advantage and how the decision 
will be made on which organisations, and which mediation team, are the best 
equipped to lead the effort. Putting such decision-making clauses in the passive 
tense, without an executing agent, allows for such decisions to go unmade and 
for no one to be held accountable to carrying out the decision (Nathan 2010a).
The UN (2009b) recognised that while comparative advantage is often 
mentioned in statements regarding division of labour, these advantages 
are rarely identified and organisational activities are seldom aligned to 
any significant degree with presumed or actual comparative advantages. 
Moreover, an exclusive focus on comparative advantage remains difficult for 
international organisations as they are driven as much by political interests as 
by their mission and mandates (United Nations 2009b). Although the level of 
sharing and collaboration between the UN and African regional organisations 
has been increasing, this analysis establishes that there is still a large lapse in 
effective and professional cooperation based on the comparative advantage 
principle and that the principle is failing to be implemented at least partly due 
to the continuing politicised nature of African regional organisations. 
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Moreover, the field of mediation specifically remains, in many ways, 
unprofessionalised and under-capacitated. While the UN has worked to 
improve its professional mediation capacity, as noted in the Report of the 
Secretary-General on enhancing mediation and its support activities (United 
Nations 2009a), its partner regional organisations have not made the same 
strides. No specific institutional rules for mediation have been made or 
approved within the AU or the RECs. A deficit of trained human capacity 
for mediation, continuing financial limitations, and the lack of an adequate 
framework or mechanism at the AU to oversee mediation, often means that 
‘mediation processes have still taken an improvised or reactive approach, rather 
than an institutionalised approach’ (Govender and Ngandu 2010:11). It is for 
this reason that the world of international mediation has been characterised 
as ‘idiosyncratic and ad hoc, overly determined by power politics, deadlines 
and organizational tussles’ (Nathan 2010c:3). Instead of approaching an 
impending or active conflict with the best suited mediation team, the best 
suited institution in the lead, and a clear plan of action for the management of 
the conflict, other political variables and arbitrary events are often allowed to 
determine how a conflict will be managed by concerned actors and institutions. 
Furthermore, this pressurised and unregulated environment often leads to what 
has been termed ‘competitive peacemaking’ or ‘crowdedness’. In many current 
cases in Africa, including Zimbabwe, the DRC and Madagascar, mediators have 
had to act in parallel with or even against other state, non-state and multilateral 
actors that are also trying to involve themselves in the peacemaking process. 
Being unable to clearly and quickly select a lead organisation or individual, 
would-be mediators attempt to coordinate their efforts. In some cases, they 
have created a Joint Mediation team (as in Madagascar), but this has been put 
into practice with limited success (Whitfield 2010). Potential mediators can be 
played off against one another by the parties, delaying progress and creating 
new complications in the conflict (United Nations 2009a). At the present, this 
crowdedness or lack of coordination remains as a substantial and unresolved 
challenge in African peacemaking.
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Sub-regional weaknesses and political obstacles – SADC 
in peacemaking
Each of the sub-regional organisations has its own unique dynamic that affects 
its ability to carry out successful peacemaking and to cooperate with the AU 
and UN on joint efforts. An organisation’s effectiveness in peacemaking 
is dependent on whether the member states truly have the political will to 
make the organisation effective and whether enough political cohesion exists 
to create a lasting and sufficiently strong consensus on peace and security in 
the region. There must be more than just a simple external consensus that 
peace in the region is worth pursuing. For intra-regional peacemaking to be 
successful, states must share an internal logic with a normative consensus that 
allows them to operate with close political cooperation on a set of shared and 
enforceable norms (Nathan 2010b). Such common values are indispensable 
to help states overcome their disputes, build trust and act with a common 
purpose when confronted with a conflict. This section explores the absence 
of common values and unity in the Southern African region, resulting in less 
effectiveness of regional conflict resolution efforts. 
Many academics and policymakers have provided detailed and compelling 
critiques of SADC as an organisation. This article focuses on the specific 
limitations that hinder the partnership it has with the AU and UN in carrying 
out effective peacemaking. Firstly, SADC solidarity politics, and the liberation 
legacy’s taboo on making censure or disagreement publicly known, bog down 
the organisation and create serious obstacles to progressive SADC leadership 
in peacemaking (Hull and Derblom 2009). SADC has established strong 
protocols on security cooperation and safeguards on democracy and human 
rights, but continues to operate on the pillars of absolute sovereignty and 
solidarity (Hammerstad 2005). There is even an understanding that member 
states have kept the SADC secretariat weak in order to avoid the creation of 
an interventionist bureaucracy that could interfere in their sensitive security 
issues (Adebajo 2010). With these limitations on political will and capacity, 




Divisions among leading states – between those disposed towards military 
solutions (namely Zimbabwe) and those disposed towards diplomatic efforts 
(South Africa) – created paralysing tension in the 1990s (Adetula 2008). These 
divisions were evident in SADC’s 1998 intervention in the DRC, where it 
acted as a ‘bipolar’ entity, adopting two incompatible strategies led by the two 
sub-regional powers (Williams 2005). The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security had been, by some accounts, manipulated to justify the aims of 
Zimbabwe in the DRC and later, to legitimise South Africa’s intervention in 
Lesotho. With continuing distrust of South Africa resulting from the apartheid 
legacy, South Africa must make clear its desire for real cooperation if it 
wants to counter hegemonic alliances and deepening divisions (Adebajo and 
Landsberg 2003). This has created a less enthusiastic stance on interventions 
in SADC and tempered the political willingness of SADC countries to realise 
their peace and security aims (Adebajo 2008). The distrust created by these 
interventions has lasted to the present, and will likely continue to manifest 
itself in declarations of the importance of sovereignty and the traditional 
norm of non-interference.
While SADC reformed its ‘Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation’ in 2001 and came out with a new Strategic Indicative Plan in 2004 
(Southern African Development Community 2004), the organisation may still 
be considered a tool for achieving the national interests of Member States 
rather than an organisation endowed with political decision-making powers 
(Van Nieuwkerk 2006). Moreover, since both the principles of sovereignty and 
the possibility of intervention coexist within the AU’s Constitutive Act, the 
principles will likely be applied on a case-by-case basis ‘depending on political 
processes and interests’ (Bogland, Egnell and Lagerström 2008:34). It is hence 
likely that in the SADC, the continuing lack of trust and dearth of common 
values among member states will forestall consensus, delaying any rapid 
response possibility or positive cooperation with the AU and UN. 
SADC’s wide membership is also proving problematic. Having included the 
DRC in 1997, the organisation was tied into a conflict that is more strongly 
related to conflict dynamics in Central Africa. The two states that invaded 
the DRC in 1998, Rwanda and Uganda, are not member states of SADC and 
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hence largely outside its influence. While Mandela apparently thought that 
SADC could play a positive role in conflict management in the DRC, helping 
to prevent a regional conflagration of instability (Khadiagala 2009), the 
organisation proved it was not up to this challenge, partly due to its limited 
scope of influence in the Central African region. The problems of unclear 
sub-regions and overlapping membership in multiple regional organisations, 
therefore, make regional conflict resolution efforts further complicated. 
On the one hand, SADC has remained united enough to largely keep the 
UN and other international players out of the recent conflict in Zimbabwe, 
where South Africa has taken a lead in peacemaking and tried to prevent 
much external interference, painting it as a Western anti-Zimbabwean crusade 
(International Crisis Group 2010c). On the other hand, the UN and AU have 
been more involved, at different levels, in the conflicts in the SADC Member 
States of the DRC and Madagascar, attributable to the lower levels of political 
interest in these conflicts and/or the higher demands of these very involved 
and long-lasting peace processes that rely upon international resources. In 
reality, while SADC calls itself a regional organisation and aims toward the 
building of a functioning security community, norms of cooperation, trust 
and rule enforcement are not yet consistently followed by Member States. 
Given the at times dysfunctional nature of the sub-regional organisations in 
Africa, it is clear that the principle of subsidiarity cannot be consistently relied 
upon nor can ‘comparative advantage’ be consistently determined. 
Lessons from Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and the DRC
While the conflict in Madagascar is, relatively, the shortest-running and perhaps 
least historically troubling among conflicts in Southern Africa, the relationship 
between the UN, AU and SADC in its conflict resolution efforts on the island 
has been tension-filled and problematic. Confusion and an absolute lack of 
coherent leadership undermined the mediation process that was initiated 
after the 2009 coup d’état. At least six mediators from different organisations 
were quickly sent to Madagascar and it was unclear who would take the 
lead (Zounmenou 2009). The SADC communiqué issued on 12 July 2009 
(Southern African Development Community 2009) included collaboration 
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with the AU, UN and International Organisation of la Francophonie (IOF), 
as well as ensuring Malagasy ownership of the process, in the mandate of 
the SADC mediation effort. This, however, was never really accomplished. 
Despite the establishment of a ‘contact group’ that first met 30 April 2009, 
and the mandate of AU Special Envoy, Ablassé Ouedraogo, to take the lead in 
overseeing the peacemaking efforts, the mediation of the Joint Mediation Team 
was dominated by SADC’s mediator, Joaquim Chissano (International Crisis 
Group 2010b). Even the contact group extended uncertainty of leadership, 
saying that the next mediation would be ‘under the auspices of the AU’ while 
also taking place ‘under the leadership of former President Joaquim Chissano, 
assisted by the SADC Mediation Team’ (International Contact Group on 
Madagascar 2009). This lack of clarity undermined the seriousness of the 
peacemaking process among the parties. 
The AU-UN relationship in 2009 was characterised by rivalry, which contributed 
to ending the UN’s mediation mandate in 2010, leaving African figures to take 
the lead. Relations between the AU and SADC were also tense in the first year 
of mediations and the AU stepped back to let SADC take the lead in 2010. 
Rather than clearly leading, however, the next phase was characterised by a 
lack of unity and cooperation among the international community, including 
the appearance of political interventions by France, which maintained an 
active diplomatic role. Chissano’s leadership was no longer welcomed by all the 
parties in 2010 and France urged President Zuma to take a lead, while South 
Africa was still trying to support SADC leadership (International Crisis Group 
2010b). The failure of the last international attempt created the impetus for 
a more national, home-grown solution. But as the national solution has also 
failed to formulate a plan of action that is acceptable to all the parties, SADC 
is left to try its luck again and attempt to organise successful elections that 
would, once and for all, restore political order and a semblance of democracy 
(McNeish 2011). It is obvious that this lack of coordination and diplomatic 
infighting has complicated, rather than facilitated, the peace effort.
Zimbabwe further highlights the difficulties of international cooperation in 
Southern Africa and the difficulty of utilising the principles of subsidiarity 
and comparative advantage. Shortly after the June 2008 presidential run-off 
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elections in Zimbabwe, the AU Assembly Summit took the events under 
consideration, but shied from condemning ZANU-PF’s electoral tampering 
and political violence (African Union 2008b). The resolution expressed the 
AU’s support for SADC facilitation, and recommended that SADC continue to 
carry out the mediation process by establishing a local mechanism to speed a 
negotiated end to the crisis. Certain voices within the AU, however, did call for 
stronger action in the face of ongoing stalemate. By December 2008, Kenyan 
Prime Minister Raila Odinga called for an AU ousting of President Mugabe, 
specifically requesting that the then AU Chair, Tanzanian President Jakaya 
Kikwete, should implement a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis (Okumu 
2008). Privately, a diplomatic battle ensued between Kikwete and Mbeki, with 
Presidents Kikwete, Mwanawasa of Zambia and Khama of Botswana urging 
an expanded mediation team and a more robust UN role. The efforts were 
strongly resisted by Mbeki (International Crisis Group 2008).
SADC has deferred to South Africa to take the lead on the Zimbabwe issue. 
In turn, SADC and South Africa have desired to keep the AU and the UN far 
from the Zimbabwe crisis, despite the reality that they have not initiated any 
meaningful interventions themselves. Scepticism has been widespread about 
the effectiveness of SADC mediation, but the main local actors were able to 
point to the process to show that they were doing something to handle the 
situation (IDASA 2008). The SADC Heads of State, who ultimately retain 
political power in the region, maintain that Zimbabwe’s sovereignty should 
preclude any other external intervention, despite their own guidelines against 
unconstitutional changes of government. SADC members ‘closed rank’ and 
were able to maintain this relatively coherent and unified stance throughout 
the crisis (Nathan 2010a). Opposition candidate Tsvangirai even appealed 
for AU or UN intervention in April 2008, citing a lack of progress through 
SADC, but to no avail (Security Council Report 2008). This highlights how 
international bodies can be sidelined when the principle of subsidiarity is 
championed by interested regional neighbours. 
SADC’s military intervention in the DRC in 1998 has already been widely 
discussed and criticised as an illustration of SADC’s lack of unity, dearth of 
cooperation and ability to be hijacked by national interests (Williams 2005; 
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Nathan 2002; Van Schalkwyk 2005). Despite criticisms that the subsequent 
peace process was not sufficiently inclusive, South Africa, the OAU and the 
UN played a more positive role facilitating in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
that followed the 1999 Lusaka Agreement (Khadiagala 2009). While the UNSC 
exerted pressure on both internal and neighbouring parties (Rwanda and 
Uganda) and established a UN peacekeeping operation, the dialogue led to 
the 2002 Pretoria Agreement for a transitional government. However, ethnic-
based conflict continued in Eastern DRC and political delay postponed the 
inauguration of the transitional arrangement until 2003 (Apuuli 2004). 
Political instability and conflict continued throughout the rule of the 
transitional regime.
South Africa did play a substantive role in supporting the country’s first 
democratic elections in 2006 and acted as a successful mediator for the AU 
when President Kabila’s challenger contested the results (Khadiagala 2009). 
The UN force of nearly 20 000 military personnel which remains in the country, 
has, however, been criticised as ineffective and has often been unable to stop 
atrocities (Terrie 2009). Yet on a more fundamental level, the real problem 
is that the national consolidation of democracy is stalled, Eastern Congo is 
still facing insecurity and instability, while the Congolese government is 
calling for the withdrawal of the UN, citing concerns over their sovereignty 
(International Crisis Group 2010a). While the Great Lakes Region has also set 
up regional initiatives, and SADC has pledged to cooperate with this initiative 
(2008), SADC is obviously less concerned with maintaining its position in 
the implementation and consolidation of the peace initiatives South Africa 
helped broker, leaving that largely in the hands of the UN. While the UN has 
attempted to harness the possible advantages of working with regional actors, 
the AU and SADC have largely withdrawn due to the extensive commitments 
and resources that this conflict management process has required. SADC’s 
early intervention, in any case, certainly tainted its reputation and credibility 
in dealing with the DRC, preventing it from being a reliable partner for the 
UN in the region.
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Conclusion – Limitations on regional peacemaking 
solutions in Southern Africa
The examples discussed here add strength to a tentative conclusion that the 
uncoordinated efforts carried out by SADC, the AU and the UN, may, in certain 
circumstances, have actually complicated or prolonged certain aspects of the 
conflicts in the region. While deference to local ownership of a peacemaking 
process can facilitate some comparative advantages, when local partners and 
organisations are not united and are unwilling to uphold principles of good 
governance and consolidating peace, they do not make good partners in this 
relationship. This, however, does not stop these organisations from claiming 
their right, in light of the principle of subsidiarity, to involve themselves in 
regional peacemaking.
The first conclusion that may be drawn is that regional peacemaking efforts 
are still limited in their success due to the strong devotion to national 
sovereignty held by Africa’s leaders. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk (2004:46) argues 
that ‘redesigned structures will not make any difference to Africa’s security if 
Africa’s ruling elites do not develop the political vision and will to effectively 
promote human security on the continent’. Leaders must move away from a 
vision that promotes state security and sovereignty, towards one that promotes 
human rights and freedom from insecurity for all citizens. Although shifts 
in thinking are taking place, the continuing defence of sovereignty and unity 
in African politics, especially in Southern Africa, cannot be ignored when 
considering the (in)effectiveness of regional peacemaking. 
Secondly, the lack of consensus on the importance of good governance, and 
the absence of true commitment to regional solutions on peace and security 
issues among states in Southern Africa, continues to limit what SADC can 
contribute to the AU and UN relationship. Especially given the correlation 
between conflict and democratic transitions and elections in Africa, it is 
important that regional organisations have a united stance on challenges to 
these principles. Some consensus on democratisation and good governance 
is a precondition for any sustainable regional cooperation (Fawcett 1995). Yet 
sub-regional peacemaking is often aimed at stopping immediate violence, and 
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does much less to solve the underlying governance problems and ensure long-
term stability, as seen in the regional efforts in Madagascar, Zimbabwe and the 
DRC. Without consensus on upholding these principles, they have been unable 
to consolidate lasting peace and to act as credible partners in peacemaking.
Finally, this lack of willingness contributes to the fact that responses by regional 
and sub-regional organisations in Africa are usually ad hoc and reactive, 
rather than proactive. This reflects the lack of institutionalised structures and 
decision-making processes to deal with non-military conflict management 
and resolution activities. The unclear and contradicting principles governing 
the relationship between the UN, AU and RECs worsen this problem, despite 
attempts to formalise roles under the AU. Whether the UN or AU has the 
ultimate responsibility and coordinating role in Africa has not been clarified, 
nor has the scope of the principle of subsidiarity in regional peacemaking. 
The UN and its partners must reconsider and strengthen the principles of 
their relationship and the shared decision-making process for peacemaking 
in Southern Africa. The process currently allows too much room for personal 
and national interests to dominate peacemaking processes, rather than 
ensuring that the best suited strategy and mediation team, as determined by 
the principle of comparative advantage, is actually put in place. Achieving 
peace in Southern Africa has been for many years a hard-to-attain goal. While 
there is a lot of potential for creating effective partnerships that leverage the 
advantages of the UN together with local partners, they are currently not 
effectively realised.
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